In this article I reflect on meeting Professor Drucilla Cornell as a bachelor’s student at Rutgers University, working as her assistant, and the irreversible impact she had on my life. I argue that Cornell was a thinker of profound courage and that this virtue was crucial to her developing several ways beyond the philosophical anthropology of Euro-modern man. Cornell envisioned three main ways beyond what she called the “dead ends of man”: feminism, critical philosophy (including dialectics and Marxism), and African (...) humanism. These three traditions combine in an explosive, revolutionary way in Cornell’s writings; each are essential pillars of her thought. I also identify a dialectical or “productive” tension in her thinking between tendencies toward both idealist and materialist metaphysics. I conclude by recounting personal experiences with Cornell, exploring the consequences of her ethical philosophy, and posing questions that I think she could help us answer in the tumultuous times we are currently living through. (shrink)

This article addresses a problematic interpretation of African and Indian decolonial political theory, arguing it understates the positive effects anticolonial ideas have had on society and scientific efforts to understand and produce knowledge about it. Another problem is its reliance on the concept of “Western” theory, which presumes genealogical purity. Our response offers creolization as an alternative model for decolonizing political theory and uses the term “Euromodern” instead. It then explores how creolization is at the heart of the ideas of (...) intellectuals considered most paradigmatic of Western thought, and demonstrates the influence of Afro-Islamic thought on them. Subsequently, we rebut the authors’ claim that Fanon’s thought has failed to generate new methods for studying postcolonial reality and extend their analysis of Indian society beyond the frames forged by Gandhi and Spivak. Finally, we conclude by discussing Muhammad Iqbal, a uniquely creolizing and forward-looking decolonial figure from the Afro-Muslim world. (shrink)

_In this symposium, Roberto A. Carleo III, Gregory Doukas and Imogen M. Sullivan think alongside Carlos Alberto Sánchez about the contingency of human existence as it is understood in Mexican existentialism. They ask: Should the notion of a metaphysical substance be discarded altogether due to its misuse in the history of European philosophy? Or are there philosophical reasons to avoid ontological uncertainty by, for example, postulating the notion of a non-discrete substance? And if attempts to define human substantiality (...) merely seek to defy this accidentality, should scholars with deviant identities deliberately engage in a wandering beyond dominant frameworks to evade the material and hermeneutical hostility of these frameworks? How should they work alongside others to best take up their responsibility? In his reply, Sánchez considers what the project of accidentalization would imply for each of these carefully-crafted interventions._. (shrink)

How strong is the argument for requiring public deliberation by very large publics—at national or even global levels—before moving forward with efforts to use gene editing on wild populations of plants or animals? Should there be a general moratorium on any such efforts until such broad public deliberation has been successfully carried out? This article works toward recommendations about the need for and general framing of broad public deliberation. It finds that broad public deliberation is highly desirable but not flatly (...) necessary before moving forward with any local cases of gene editing in the wild. It also finds that broad public deliberation would be most helpful in generating very general guidance and is unlikely to be appropriate for specific cases. Broad public deliberation is most helpful for cases that involve higher levels of uncertainty and moral ambiguity, but separating out a distinct class of cases for deliberation is not yet possible. (shrink)

A range of views on the morality of synthetic biology and its place in public policy and political discourse.

Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment.

Should there be limits to the human alteration of the natural world? Through a study of debates about the environment, agricultural biotechnology, synthetic biology, and human enhancement, Gregory E. Kaebnick argues that such moral concerns about nature can be legitimate but are also complex, contestable, and politically limited.

Human cloning raises the most profound questions about human nature, our faith in ourselves, and our ability to make decisions that could significantly alter the character of humanity. In this exciting and accessible book, Gregory Pence offers a candid and sometimes humorous look at the arguments for and against human cloning. Originating a human being by cloning, Pence boldly argues, should not strike fear in our hearts but should be examined as a reasonable reproductive option for couples. Pence considers (...) how popular culture has influenced the way we think about cloning, and he presents a lucid and non-technical examination of the scientific research and relevant moral issues in the cloning debate. This book is a must-read for anyone who is concerned about the impact of technology on human life and for those with interests in medical ethics, sociology, and public policy. (shrink)

In the lead article in the May‐June 2019 issue of the Hastings Center Report, Aaron Wightman and coauthors consider the guiding principles for making decisions about life‐sustaining treatment for children who have profound cognitive impairments. They argue that the usual standard, which asks decision‐makers to consider what will be in the child's best interests, cannot provide sufficient guidance. Discussing this problem in HCR thirty‐five years ago, the philosopher John Arras proposed addressing it by means of a “relational potential standard,” according (...) to which decisions about providing life‐sustaining treatment to a child should depend in part on whether the child has the capacity to form human relationships. Wightman et al. build on Arras's work, but where Arras had suggested that the capacity to form relationships could be gauged by examining the child's cognitive capabilities, the authors suggest that the medical team should lean heavily on the parents’ views. (shrink)

One of the early steps in the process of putting together an issue of the Hastings Center Report is ticking through each column we plan to run in that issue and making sure that we have somebody lined up to write it and—if we already have somebody lined up to write it—that the person hasn't forgotten. But as this issue approached, one of those we had all nicely lined up contacted us first, to say that he was retiring from this (...) particular gig.For many years, we have had a wonderful rotating line-up for At Law: Rebecca Dresser, of Washington University of St. Louis; Lawrence O. Gostin, of George Washington University; and Carl Schneider, of the University of Michigan, have taken turns, each writing twice a year. .. (shrink)

Flesh of My Flesh is a collection of articles by today's most respected scientists, philosophers, bioethicists, theologians, and law professors about whether we should allow human cloning. It includes historical pieces to provide background for the current debate. Religious, philosophical, and legal points of view are all represented.

The two articles in this issue of the Report consider different ways that hospitals' organizational failings can be masked by ethics talk. In the lead article, Ann Hamric, John Arras, and Margaret Mohrmann take a critical look at the increasingly popular view that courage is a vital part of the moral armamentarium of health care professionals. It's easy to overemphasize and distort this point, they argue. Alexandra Junewicz and Stuart Youngner have a somewhat similar take on patient satisfaction surveys, which (...) are now in widespread use at most hospitals. Surveys are valuable, say Junewicz and Younger, but it is very easy to make too much of them and to misuse them. (shrink)

In the current issue of The New Atlantis, Daniel Sarewitz, professor of science and society at Arizona State University, argues that science is broken because it is managed and judged by scientists themselves, operating under Vannevar Bush's famous 1945 declaration that scientific progress depends on the “free play of free intellects … dictated by their curiosity.” With that scientific agenda, society ends up with a lot of unnecessary, uncoordinated, and unproductive research. To save science, holds Sarewitz, we need to put (...) it in the hands of people who are looking for practical solutions to specific problems. In one article in this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Kirstin Borgerson poses a question in this same conceptual space: are there too many clinical trials? Other pieces in the issue cover a mix of topics: the lead article addresses some of the challenges that will have to be faced as “artificial organs” become available, a third article looks at how crowdfunding sites like GoFundMe can be used to make public appeals for medical funding, and a special report found in a supplement to the issue offers a round of analysis and recommendations about the provision of medical care to professional football players. (shrink)

This issue of the Hastings Center Report features a couple of interesting takes on the governance challenges of emerging technologies. In an essay on the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine report published this February on human germ-line gene editing, Eric Juengst, a philosopher at the University of North Carolina, argues that the NASEM committee did not manage to rethink the rules. Juengst reaches what he calls an “eccentric conclusion”: “The committee's 2017 consensus report has been widely interpreted as (...) ‘opening the door’ to inheritable human genetic modification and holding a line against enhancement interventions. But on a close reading it does neither.” In the column Policy and Politics, Sarah Chan, a chancellor's fellow at the University of Edinburgh, discusses the emerging science of “organoids,” “embryoids,” and “synthetic human entities with embryo-like features” and calls for a sustained effort to rethink the rules for embryo research. (shrink)

A majority opinion seems to have emerged in scholarly analysis of the assortment of technologies that have been given the label “synthetic biology.” According to this view, society should allow the technology to proceed and even provide it some financial support, while monitor­ing its progress and attempting to ensure that the development leads to good outcomes. The near‐consensus is captured by the U.S. Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues in its report New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology (...) and Emerging Technologies, which arguably marked the end of a preliminary round of analysis about the ethical and policy questions raised by synthetic bi­ology. Like a number of other, earlier documents issued by various groups around the world, the re­port called attention to questions about how the technology will be used; whether it might be mis­used; what sorts of accidents might happen along the way; the economic, environmental, and social impacts of the eventual applications; whether the very idea of “synthetic biology” should be trou­bling; and how the debate over all of these ques­tions will be conducted. Also like most similar documents, however, while it called for careful monitoring and oversight of technology, it did not recommend any significant new constraints on its development and use. The commission's stance was that it would be “imprudent either to declare a moratorium on synthetic biology until all risks can be determined and mitigated, or to simply ‘let science rip,’ regardless of the likely risks.”In this report, we will take stock of the current consensus, comment on some of the major points of disagreement, and identify the next steps for the debate. In part I, we offer a brief overview of the research and applications commonly grouped together under the heading of synthetic biology, partly in order to set the stage for the rest of the discussion and partly because we want to highlight some conceptual problems that attend the very la­bel given this field. In parts II, III, and IV, we take up, respectively, three broad classes of concerns that arise in the context of synthetic biology: con­cerns about the intrinsic or inherent value of do­ing synthetic biology, concerns about the concrete harms and benefits of doing synthetic biology, and concerns about justice. Addressing these concerns requires a method for bringing the public's values to bear on policy‐making concerning emerging biotechnologies; in part V, we discuss the chal­lenges in developing such a method. (shrink)

This rich collection, popular among teachers and students alike, provides an in-depth look at major cases that have shaped the field of medical ethics. The book presents each famous (or infamous) case using extensive historical and contextual background, and then proceeds to illuminate it by careful discussion of pertinent philosophical theories and legal and ethical issues.

Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment.

In How to Build a Better Human, prominent bioethicist Gregory E. Pence argues if, we are careful and ethical, we can use genetics, biotechnology, and medicine in safe ethical ways for human enhancement. He looks at the innovations and challenges that have occurred since the birth of bioethics almost 50 years ago and considers the ethical implications of the technological advances that are just around the corner.

Can we make wise policy decisions about still‐emerging technologies—decisions that are grounded in facts yet anticipate unknowns and promote the public's preferences and values? There is a widespread feeling that we should try. There also seems to be widespread agreement that the central element in wise decisions is the assessment of benefits and costs, understood as a process that consists, at least in part, in measuring, tallying, and comparing how different outcomes would affect the public interest. But how benefits and (...) costs are best weighed when making decisions about whether to move forward with an emerging technology is not clear. Many commentators feel that the weighing is often inadequate or inappropriate. Those who argue for a “precautionary” approach to the weighing do so precisely because they feel the need for a restraint on the dominant decision‐making tools and processes for assessing outcomes.This Hastings Center special report examines those tools and processes, taking the method known as cost‐benefit analysis as a starting point. In U.S. governance, CBA, sometimes informed by risk assessment, is the most widely used and extensively studied method, and authoritative reports on genetic and reproductive technologies often use language suggestive of cost‐benefit analysis. There is also a long‐running debate about the role of values in CBA and other formal impact assessment mechanisms—and about how those mechanisms compare to the precautionary principle. The guiding idea in the report is to engage in a close examination of the strengths and limits of CBA for ensuring that emerging technologies are used in ways that square with the public's values, drawing on applications of synthetic biology to illustrate and sharpen the analysis and then considering corrections to CBA and some alternative methodologies that handle values differently. (shrink)

The emergence of de‐extinction is a study in technological optimism. What has already been accomplished in recovering ancient genomes, recreating them, and reproducing animals with engineered genomes is amazing but also has a long ways to go to achieve “de‐extinction” as most people would understand that term. Still, with some caveats in place, creating a functional replacement for an extinct species may sometimes be doable, and given the right goals, might sometimes make sense. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (...) guidelines for de‐extinction do a reasonable job of keeping the caveats in place and clarifying the goals. In fact, given the right caveats about what de‐extinction can accomplish, we should pay a lot of attention to the technology and should think carefully about the goals. Not only has the technology been advancing, but our environmental standards have been getting looser and more flexible, providing less guidance for implementing the technology. The guiding ideals for conservation are often explained as a choice between John Muir, founder of The Sierra Club, and Gifford Pinchot, who helped create the U.S. Forest Service. Muir argued for preserving some places in the world in their natural state because of their great value and beauty. Pinchot, by contrast, was bluntly utilitarian. He argued for trying to keep some natural places more or less undamaged so that we could use them later. There has long been dissatisfaction with this choice, and in the last couple of decades, a number of prominent voices have proposed a “gardening ethic” as a new standard that combines elements of Muir and Pinchot. A gardening ethic is supposed to both celebrate the land and declare that it must now be managed. But what would good gardening mean when it comes to de‐extinction? (shrink)

Now in its twentieth year of publication, this rich collection, popular among teachers and students alike, provides an in-depth look at major cases that have shaped the field of medical ethics. The book presents each famous (or infamous) case using extensive historical and contextual background, and then proceeds to illuminate it by careful discussion of pertinent philosophical theories and legal and ethical issues.

This collection highlights such issues as how the nature of time is relevant to the question of whether God is temporal and how God's other attributes are ...

The emerging phenomenon of genetic paternity testing shows how good science and useful social reform can run off the rails. Genetic paternity testing enables us to sort out, in a transparent and decisive way, the age-old but traditionally never-quite-answerable question of whether a child is genetically related to the husband of the child's mother. Given the impossibility of settling this question for certain, British and American law has long held that a biological relationship must almost always be assumed to exist. (...) According to what is known as the “marital presumption” or “presumption of legitimacy,” a child born to a woman within a marital relationship is assumed to be the biological child of the woman's husband unless he was absent, impotent, or sterile. In other words, if paternity was not a physical impossibility for the husband, there was a nearly irrebuttable presumption that he was the father of the child. The husband was locked into the role of fatherhood. a. (shrink)

In The Ethics of Food, Gregory E. Pence brings together a collection of voices who share the view that the ethics of genetically modified food is among the most pressing societal questions of our time. This comprehensive collection addresses a broad range of subjects, including the meaning of food, moral analyses of vegetarianism and starvation, the safety and environmental risks of genetically modified food, issues of global food politics and the food industry, and the relationships among food, evolution, and (...) human history. (shrink)

In this important new book Gregory E. Pence looks at issues on the frontiers of medicine including gene therapy to produce 'brave new babies,' cloning, human eggs and embryos for sale, and experiments on human embryos. Pence argues that the conservatism of the medical establishment, the bioethics community, and the public at large has created shibboleths that impede improvements in our quality of life.

Richard Dawkins’s best argument against the existence of God aims to show that the universe fits better with atheism than with theism. The fact that complex life developed gradually over a long period of time is required by an atheistic view but is not required by a theistic view. This fact, then, supports the atheistic view. This argument does raise the probability of atheism. I discuss four analogous arguments that point towards theism. I conclude that Dawkins’s argument lends some support (...) for atheism, but his strategy suggests sufficient arguments to see that the total case points in the opposite direction. (shrink)

Leading bioethicist Gregory Pence demystifies seven foundational theories of addiction to reveal how they must work together to build more comprehensive solutions. Concerned citizens, individuals suffering from addiction, their families, and those who devote their lives to fighting addiction will find this new perspective a hopeful call to arms.

Evan Fales has argued that divine causation is not possible. His central argument involves an analysis of causation that requires that there has to be a mapping feature to guarantee that the particular effect follows the particular cause. He suggests that being related in space and time will provide the means to map the right effects onto their causes. In this paper, I argue that the spatial relation between cause and effect is not necessary to the causal relation. In cases (...) of volition, it appears that the mapping of particular effects onto volitions is achieved by the intentional content of the volition. Therefore, spatial relations are not necessary to causation and the impossibility of divine causation has not been shown. (shrink)

This book discusses aspects of God's causal activity. It explores historical views of divine causal activity from the Pre-Socratics to Hume. It also addresses contemporary issues related to God's causal activity, including the possibility of special acts of God, proposals of models of divine causation, and analyses of divine conservation.

As the #1 topic in bioethics, cloning has made big news since Dolly's announced birth in 1998. In a new book building on his classic Who's Afraid of Human Cloning?, pioneering bioethicist Gregory E. Pence continues to advocate a reasoned view of cloning. Beginning with his surreal experiences as an expert witness before Congressional and California legislative committees, Pence analyzes the astounding recent progress in animal cloning; the coming surprises about human cloning; the links between animal, stem cell, and (...) human cloning; embryo politics; and other hot topics like artificial wombs and transgenic animals. -/- Pence rebuts the growing chorus of naysayers headed by Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, who attack the biomedical sciences, and explains why cloning will save endangered species and beloved pets, and help future children and people with degenerative diseases. (shrink)

Two disputes are waged simultaneously in the pages of this issue of the Report, but it might be easy to lose track of the second. The obvious dispute is about resource allocation in health policy: the question is whether limited health care resources should be spent on identified victims—people whose struggles with disease have made the news—when the same investment might provide more help if spent on a larger number of unknown, merely “statistical” people. The second, less easily noticed dispute (...) is about the challenge of crafting public policy when the arguments pro and con are not decisive. (shrink)

There are three broad themes in this issue of the Hastings Center Report. First, a special report published as a supplement to the issue addresses the medical and health policy issues faced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender patients. Inside the issue, the two articles take up questions about how caregivers may justify a refusal to provide a medical service that a patient has requested. The issue also contains a set of essays that have emerged from a collaborative effort by (...) The Hastings Center and the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues to promote scholarly engagement with the practical problem of teaching caregivers, researchers, scientists, and others to address bioethical problems. What appears here is the first installment of a series that will appear in the pages of the Report well into the 2015 volume. (shrink)

God’s regular causal activity is traditionally held to include his creation of the world, his conserving all created things in being and his concurrence with the causal activities of finite causes. Divine causation requires that God is an agent. In this paper, I apply E. J. Lowe’s view of human agency to God. This application requires certain adjustments. Lowe takes it that when a person acts for reasons, these reasons are lacks of some kind. I argue that his account can (...) apply to God if we think of the reasons for God’s action as connected to purposes rather than to needs. (shrink)